Bridging the Gap: Key Issues Bangladesh’s Dr. Yunus May Raise with India’s PM Modi

When Nobel laureate Dr. Muhammad Yunus, serving as Bangladesh’s interim leader, meets Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi in Bangkok, it marks a critical opportunity to address longstanding grievances in Bangladesh-India relations. Despite a history of cooperation, several unresolved issues continue to strain the friendship between Dhaka and New Delhi. From economic disparities to environmental fallout, and from border tensions to water-sharing disputes, these concerns carry deep importance for Bangladesh’s people and its future. A frank discussion on these matters – and tangible steps toward solutions – would not only ease bilateral irritants but also reinforce mutual trust. Below, we explore the major issues Dr. Yunus could bring to the table, highlighting why they matter to Bangladesh and recent events that underscore their urgency:

  • Trade Imbalance and Market Access: Bangladesh faces a large trade deficit with India, fueling calls for fairer terms.

  • Environmental and Climate Concerns: Indian upstream activities (dams, water releases) often have downstream impacts in Bangladesh’s ecology and public safety.

  • Border Security and Incidents: Frequent border clashes and civilian deaths from shooting incidents provoke public anger in Bangladesh and demands for accountability.

  • Water-Sharing Disputes: Rivers like the Teesta and Ganges are lifelines for Bangladesh, but unresolved sharing agreements and upstream diversions create chronic water stress.

1. Economic and Trade-Related Injustices

Bangladesh’s economic ties with India are robust but asymmetrical. Bilateral trade has grown to around $13 billion annually, yet Bangladesh consistently runs a large deficit – India enjoyed a roughly $9.2 billion trade surplus in fiscal year 2023-24 (Bangladesh crisis: How trade with India could face major disruptions | bilaterals.org). Bangladesh relies heavily on imports of key commodities from India (such as cotton, fuel, and food staples), while its own exports to India are minimal by comparison (e.g. India imported only about $391 million in Bangladeshi ready-made garments in 2023) (Bangladesh crisis: How trade with India could face major disruptions | bilaterals.org). This imbalance fuels perceptions of economic injustice. Dhaka has been pushing for greater access to the Indian market and removal of barriers that hinder its exports.

Key trade grievances include:

Bangladesh sees these economic issues as core to a more just partnership. Dr. Yunus is likely to press for measures to reduce the trade gap – for example, expediting a potential Bangladesh-India free trade agreement or improving transport links – and to urge India to show more consideration before imposing export curbs that hurt Bangladeshi consumers. Addressing trade frictions would not only help Bangladesh’s economy but also build goodwill. India, for its part, may highlight steps it has taken (such as past duty-free access for Bangladeshi exports) and emphasize that boosting bilateral trade is a win–win if handled properly. The meeting offers a chance to seek a more balanced economic relationship, so that prosperity flows both ways across the border.

2. Environmental Issues and Downstream Impacts

Environmental concerns rank high among Bangladesh’s grievances, given its downstream position. Bangladesh is a low-lying delta nation acutely affected by how India manages rivers and ecological resources upstream. Indian actions – from dam construction to river water releases – can have outsized effects on Bangladesh’s environment, sometimes detrimental. Dr. Yunus could raise specific cases where Bangladesh feels it has suffered due to Indian policies, appealing for more cooperative and sensitive environmental management.

Recent and past incidents illustrate these worries:

  • Unilateral Water Releases and Flooding: In August 2024, severe flash floods swamped eastern Bangladesh (Sylhet and Chattogram regions). Bangladesh’s interim government openly blamed India for releasing water from an upstream dam in Tripura without warning, accusing it of causing the sudden deluge (Unprecedented Floods Fuel Bangladesh-India Tension – The Diplomat). Student protesters even decried the act as “water terrorism” amid growing anti-India sentiment (Unprecedented Floods Fuel Bangladesh-India Tension – The Diplomat). India strongly denied deliberate wrongdoing, explaining that extreme rainfall in the dam’s catchment forced an automatic release and that Indian officials had attempted to warn Bangladesh in advance (Unprecedented Floods Fuel Bangladesh-India Tension – The Diplomat). Regardless of intent, the episode fueled anger in Bangladesh, underscoring the need for better coordination on dam operations and flood control. Bangladesh wants India to improve early warning systems and jointly manage such events so that downstream communities aren’t caught off guard by man-made floods.

  • Upstream Dams and Ecological Fallout: Bangladeshis have long been anxious about India’s dam-building on shared rivers. A prominent example is the proposed Tipaimukh Hydroelectric Dam on the Barak River in India’s Manipur state. Ever since plans surfaced in the 2000s, Bangladeshi experts and opposition groups have protested, warning that the dam could alter river flow into Bangladesh’s Sylhet region, damaging ecosystems and livelihoods. The project has been widely criticized for its potential environmental impact on downstream Bangladesh (Controversial Tipaimukh Hydroelectric Dam Strains India-Bangladesh Relations). India insists Tipaimukh is for power generation and flood control (not water withdrawal) and would not significantly reduce water flow, dismissing some of Bangladesh’s fears as overblown (Controversial Tipaimukh Hydroelectric Dam Strains India-Bangladesh Relations). However, the lack of transparency and consultation has bred mistrust. Dr. Yunus might urge that any revival of Tipaimukh or similar projects be done with Bangladesh’s full input (or not at all), and that joint environmental impact assessments be conducted for all upstream interventions.

  • Historical Water Diversions – Farakka Barrage: Bangladesh’s concerns are rooted in lived experience. In the 1970s, India built the Farakka Barrage on the Ganges River, just upstream of the Bangladesh border, to divert water for irrigation and flush silt from Kolkata’s port. The result was a drastic drop in dry-season flow to Bangladesh’s Ganges (Padma) basin. This reduced flow led to increased salinity intrusion inland, contributing to the degradation of farmland and wetlands in southwestern Bangladesh (including parts of the Sundarbans mangrove) (Salinity in drinking water - Climate Change Impacts on Health and Population in Bangladesh). The environmental damage was lasting, as the altered river regime caused rivers to silt up and coastal ecosystems to suffer (Salinity in drinking water - Climate Change Impacts on Health and Population in Bangladesh). Although a Ganges water-sharing treaty in 1996 helped mitigate the shortages, the Farakka experience remains a cautionary tale in Bangladesh about how Indian upstream projects can “permanently change the soil, water, and environment” downstream (Salinity in drinking water - Climate Change Impacts on Health and Population in Bangladesh). This history amplifies Bangladesh’s sensitivity to any new water projects India undertakes.

From Bangladesh’s perspective, these examples all point to a need for greater environmental cooperation. Dr. Yunus may propose strengthening bilateral mechanisms to manage shared natural resources – perhaps reviving the Joint Rivers Commission in earnest – and finalizing guidelines on dam operations, data sharing, and emergency response. He could request that India consult Bangladesh before initiating any project that alters river flows or ecosystems affecting Bangladesh. Given Bangladesh’s extreme vulnerability to climate change, it might also seek India’s partnership in broader climate adaptation efforts (for instance, coordinated reforestation upstream to reduce sedimentation and floods). An informative, balanced tone will be key: Bangladesh can acknowledge India’s development needs, while stressing that downstream impacts must be jointly managed in the spirit of good neighborliness. For India, addressing these environmental concerns is not only about allaying Bangladesh’s fears – it’s about demonstrating responsible regional leadership on sustainability.

3. Border Conflicts and Security Concerns

Despite a largely peaceful boundary, the Bangladesh-India border has periodically been the scene of deadly incidents and tensions. Bangladesh shares a 4,000 km border with India, and ensuring harmony along this line is crucial. However, issues such as border killings, smuggling, and security sweeps have caused friction. Dr. Yunus is expected to voice Bangladesh’s alarm at continued loss of Bangladeshi lives at the border and to seek stronger commitments from Mr. Modi to curb such incidents. Conversely, India’s security concerns – like cross-border trafficking – also factor into the conversation, meaning both sides need to find common ground on better border management.

The most emotive issue is undoubtedly the recurring shooting of Bangladeshi civilians by India’s Border Security Force (BSF). These so-called “border killings” have been a thorn in relations for decades, drawing widespread outrage in Bangladesh. Human rights monitors document dozens of Bangladeshis (often cattle traders or villagers) killed near the frontier each year. For example, at least 31 Bangladeshis were killed by the BSF in 2023 alone (28 of them shot dead) (Bangladesh protests killing of a national by Indian BSF). This is not an isolated year – over 500 Bangladeshis have been killed at the Indo-Bangladesh border since 2009, according to rights groups (Bangladesh protests killing of a national by Indian BSF). Such statistics galvanize public opinion in Bangladesh, where people view the killings as a grievous injustice. Victims like 15-year-old Felani Khatun (shot while crossing back into Bangladesh in 2011, her body left hanging on the barbed wire fence) have become symbols of this tragedy in Bangladeshi media.

Dhaka has repeatedly protested these incidents through diplomatic channels. In October 2024, Bangladesh’s Foreign Ministry again lodged a formal protest over a Bangladeshi citizen shot by the BSF, noting with frustration that despite India’s promises to aim for “zero” border deaths, the killings continue unabated (Bangladesh protests killing of a national by Indian BSF). Bangladesh’s official stance is that these shootings are “undesirable and unwarranted” and violate the countries’ 1975 border guidelines (Bangladesh protests killing of a national by Indian BSF). Dr. Yunus is likely to press Mr. Modi on this point – seeking a renewed pledge and concrete actions from India to end the use of lethal force against unarmed Bangladeshis. Possible measures could include better coordination between border guards, improved training and protocols for the BSF to use non-lethal methods, and joint investigations of any serious incidents.

From India’s perspective, the border poses security challenges that it cannot ignore, which is often its rationale for a tough stance. Smuggling of goods (especially cattle from India into Bangladesh, and phensedyl cough syrup or narcotics in the other direction) and illegal crossings are persistent problems. The BSF claims it usually fires in self-defense or to prevent crimes, and that it is working to adopt less lethal tactics. Indeed, both nations have legitimate interests in securing the border – Bangladesh itself has cooperated to crack down on insurgent militants who once took shelter on its side (Bangladesh crisis: How trade with India could face major disruptions | bilaterals.org), and it does not condone illicit trade. The core issue is proportionality and human life: Bangladesh argues that petty criminals or trespassers should be apprehended or warned off without being killed. This humanitarian appeal is something Dr. Yunus, known globally for his advocacy of human dignity, will strongly emphasize.

Beyond shootings, border management discussions may touch on other concerns too. There are isolated cases of border disputes (now largely resolved by the 2015 Land Boundary Agreement that exchanged old enclaves and simplified the boundary) and occasional misunderstandings between the forces. Bangladesh might request India’s cooperation in completing border fencing in a mutually agreed manner, or soliciting India’s help in combating the influx of illicit arms and drugs that affect both societies. Overall, ensuring a peaceful border is in both neighbors’ interest. By addressing Bangladesh’s grievances on civilian deaths and reinforcing joint security efforts, the Yunus-Modi meeting can make headway toward a border that is secure and humane. Each prevented tragedy will remove a thorn from the side of bilateral relations.

4. Water-Sharing Disputes over Rivers (Teesta, Ganges, and Others)

Perhaps the most critical and politically sensitive topic is water-sharing. Bangladesh and India share 54 rivers that flow from India (and the Himalayas) downstream into Bangladesh (Unprecedented Floods Fuel Bangladesh-India Tension – The Diplomat). Access to river water is a lifeline for Bangladesh – essential for agriculture, drinking supply, and ecosystems – especially in the dry season. Yet, except for the Ganges, most of these transboundary rivers lack formal water-sharing treaties, often leading to perceptions in Bangladesh that India (as the upper riparian) takes more than its fair share. Disputes over rivers like the Teesta have dragged on for years, becoming a source of public resentment and diplomatic frustration. Dr. Yunus has already indicated that resolving water conflicts is a priority for his interim government (Teesta Water Dispute - Wikipedia), and in talks with Mr. Modi he will undoubtedly seek progress on this front. Two rivers stand out: Teesta – where no agreement exists yet, and Ganges – where a treaty exists but is up for renewal and scrutiny.

Teesta River Dispute: The Teesta is crucial for Bangladesh’s northern region, which relies on its flow for irrigation of crops in the dry winter months. For India, Teesta waters are important for West Bengal (especially the agrarian communities of North Bengal) and for hydropower projects upstream in Sikkim. A fair sharing arrangement has proven elusive. Bangladesh has been pressing for a Teesta water-sharing treaty since at least 2011, when a deal was nearly reached – reportedly giving Bangladesh 37.5% of Teesta’s dry-season flow – only to be scuttled at the last minute (Teesta Water Dispute - Wikipedia). The cause was political opposition within India: the Chief Minister of West Bengal, Mamata Banerjee, refused to endorse the deal over concerns it would hurt her state’s farmers (Teesta Water Dispute - Wikipedia). Since then, the Teesta pact has remained in limbo. This unresolved status is seen in Bangladesh as a major injustice, especially since Bangladesh had earlier made concessions (like granting India transit access through its territory) with an expectation of reciprocity on Teesta.

The impact of the impasse on Bangladesh is significant. Water shortages in the Teesta dependent areas have severely hurt agriculture in Bangladesh’s Rangpur region, drying up canals and reducing crop yields. According to research by the International Food Policy Research Institute, Bangladesh loses about 1.5 million tons of rice production each year due to inadequate Teesta water in the dry season (Teesta Water Dispute - Wikipedia) – a stark indicator of how livelihoods are at stake. Meanwhile, India’s unilateral use of Teesta via upstream dams and the Gazoldoba barrage in West Bengal continues, often leaving only a trickle for Bangladesh in winter (Teesta Water Dispute - Wikipedia). This has fostered feelings of betrayal among the Bangladeshi public. It’s no surprise that anti-India slogans like “Teesta is Bangladesh’s right” echo during protests, and Bangladesh even explored getting financial help from other partners (such as China or the World Bank) to develop Teesta irrigation on its side (Unprecedented Floods Fuel Bangladesh-India Tension – The Diplomat) – moves that caught India’s attention.

Dr. Yunus is expected to make a strong case that resolving Teesta is long overdue. Given that he is an interim leader without the baggage of past Awami League or BJP politics, there might be a fresh opening to discuss Teesta pragmatically. He could propose interim arrangements to guarantee Bangladesh a minimum flow until a permanent treaty is signed, or seek Mr. Modi’s personal intervention to overcome internal Indian hurdles. Yunus might also highlight that helping Bangladesh on Teesta would greatly improve India’s image among Bangladeshis, tamping down anti-Indian sentiment (Bangladesh-India Relations at Stake: The Way Forward – The Diplomat) (Bangladesh-India Relations at Stake: The Way Forward – The Diplomat). For India, the dilemma has been balancing West Bengal’s interests with Bangladesh’s – any solution likely needs buy-in from Kolkata. Still, Modi could reassure Yunus that India remains committed to a fair Teesta agreement, perhaps by restarting Joint Rivers Commission dialogues that have stalled. This meeting in Bangkok could revitalize the political will to finalize the Teesta treaty, turning a new page in water cooperation.

Ganges (Padma) Water Sharing: In contrast to Teesta, the Ganges water issue had a landmark resolution in 1996, when Bangladesh and India signed a 30-year Ganges Water Sharing Treaty. That agreement (championed by then Bangladeshi PM Sheikh Hasina and Indian PM Deve Gowda) allocates flows of the Ganges in the dry season between the two countries, based on a schedule of alternating weeks with guaranteed minimum flows. It was hailed as a diplomatic breakthrough at the time, ending decades of disputes over Farakka. Now, however, the Ganges treaty is nearing its expiry in 2026, which raises new questions and anxieties in Bangladesh (Ganges treaty: What happens after 2026? | The Financial Express). Dhaka is keen to renew the treaty – and if possible, improve it to address shortcomings witnessed over the past 30 years.

While the 1996 treaty largely kept the peace, Bangladeshi experts note that it hasn’t always delivered the expected results. They point out that during many critical dry years, Bangladesh did not receive its full agreed share of Ganges waters (Ganges treaty: What happens after 2026? | The Financial Express), due to various factors. Some analyses blame inaccurate flow projections and increasing upstream withdrawals by India for the shortfalls (Ganges treaty: What happens after 2026? | The Financial Express) (Ganges treaty: What happens after 2026? | The Financial Express). Essentially, the pie of water in the Ganges during lean months turned out smaller than assumed, and Bangladesh often felt shortchanged. Climate change and upstream usage (e.g., new irrigation in India) have further strained the situation (Ganges treaty: What happens after 2026? | The Financial Express) (Ganges treaty: What happens after 2026? | The Financial Express). As 2026 approaches, Bangladesh wants to ensure the renewed agreement guarantees an equitable share that accounts for present realities, so that its downstream ecosystems and farms are protected. Issues like minimum flow guarantees, better data sharing, and perhaps extending cooperation to the whole Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin (not just the Ganges at Farakka) are on the table.

In talks with Modi, Dr. Yunus will likely seek assurances that India is ready to promptly renew the Ganges treaty in a fair manner. India’s side has indicated willingness – technical committees have been meeting on the issue (Indo-Bangla technical teams meet in Kolkata ahead of Ganga Water ...) – but Bangladesh will want to emphasize how critical it is to get it right, given millions depend on the Padma’s waters. Yunus might also broach discussions on some of the other shared rivers beyond Teesta and Ganges. For instance, agreements on rivers like the Feni (where a small sharing arrangement was made in 2019) or the Kushiyara (agreement signed in 2022) show that cooperation is possible on lesser rivers. Bangladesh might propose expediting negotiations on a few other important common rivers (perhaps the Dharla or Dudhkumar in the north) to build momentum, or even suggest a comprehensive framework for all transboundary rivers. At minimum, acknowledging Bangladesh’s water rights and concerns will be a key part of Yunus’s agenda.

Why it Matters for Bangladesh: Water is life for Bangladesh – its agriculture, food security, and environment are intertwined with these rivers. Unresolved water disputes like Teesta are not abstract diplomatic spats; they translate into parched rice fields, lost incomes, and ecological strain on the ground in Bangladesh. Moreover, water issues have taken on a symbolic national importance – equitable water sharing is seen as a matter of sovereignty and justice. For a downstream country of over 170 million people, ensuring upstream neighbors don’t leave it high and dry is an existential concern. By raising these issues, Dr. Yunus speaks to the heart of Bangladesh’s populace who have waited years for progress. A fair deal on Teesta and a good-faith renewal of the Ganges treaty would be major victories for Bangladesh, and would cement a legacy of goodwill for the Modi government as well.

Conclusion: Toward a Future of Fairness and Friendship

As Dr. Muhammad Yunus and Prime Minister Narendra Modi engage in dialogue in Bangkok, the spotlight will be on these four critical dimensions of Bangladesh-India relations. Each issue – whether it’s balancing trade and tariffs, safeguarding the environment, ensuring humane border security, or sharing lifeblood rivers – carries profound weight for Bangladesh’s welfare and the region’s stability. By candidly addressing Bangladesh’s grievances and India’s concerns, the two leaders have a chance to break logjams that have lingered for too long.

The importance of this meeting cannot be overstated. For Bangladesh, it is an opportunity to seek redress on what it views as historical and ongoing injustices, and to assert its rights as an equal partner. For India, it is a moment to reassure a neighbor that India’s rise will not come at the cost of Bangladesh’s interests – in fact, that both nations can rise together. Any positive outcomes – be it a roadmap to reduce the trade gap, a commitment to zero border killings, movement on the Teesta treaty, or improved flood warning systems – will send a powerful signal to the people of both countries that their leaders are listening and acting.

Ultimately, Bangladesh and India are bound by geography and a shared future. Goodwill must flow as freely as the rivers between them. If Dr. Yunus and Mr. Modi can make progress on these persistent issues, it will not only resolve points of friction but unlock new potential for cooperation (in trade, energy, climate adaptation, and more) (Bangladesh-India Relations at Stake: The Way Forward – The Diplomat). A relationship marked by mutual respect and fairness will strengthen both nations’ prosperity and security. The Bangkok meeting is a chance to turn the page – to transform these long-standing problems from sources of discord into pillars of a stronger Bangladesh-India partnership. Both leaders, and their peoples, have much to gain by seizing this opportunity for honest dialogue and concrete solutions.

Sources:

  1. Diplomat, “Bangladesh-India Relations at Stake: The Way Forward” – discusses unresolved issues like border killings, Teesta water-sharing, and trade barriers fueling tensions (Bangladesh-India Relations at Stake: The Way Forward – The Diplomat) (Bangladesh-India Relations at Stake: The Way Forward – The Diplomat).

  2. India Today via Bilaterals, “Bangladesh crisis: How trade with India could face major disruptions” – notes that in FY2024 India’s trade surplus with Bangladesh was $9.2 billion (Bangladesh imports far more than it exports) (Bangladesh crisis: How trade with India could face major disruptions | bilaterals.org), and lists major traded commodities (Bangladesh crisis: How trade with India could face major disruptions | bilaterals.org).

  3. SASEC News, “Bangladesh for Discussions with India to Remove Non-tariff Barriers” – reports Bangladesh’s commerce minister urging India to eliminate non-tariff barriers that prevent full utilization of duty-free export access (Bangladesh for Discussions with India to Remove Non-tariff Barriers | News | South Asia Subregional Economic Cooperation).

  4. Asia Times, “Onion prices anger Bangladeshis after India ban” – describes public outcry in Bangladesh after India’s 2019 onion export ban, with onion prices quadrupling (from Tk30 to Tk130/kg) and shortages causing “widespread anger” (Onion prices anger Bangladeshis after India ban - Asia Times) (Onion prices anger Bangladeshis after India ban - Asia Times).

  5. The Diplomat, “Unprecedented Floods Fuel Bangladesh-India Tension” – details how Bangladesh in Aug 2024 blamed India’s sudden dam water release for catastrophic floods, leading to protests and accusations of “inhumanity” (Unprecedented Floods Fuel Bangladesh-India Tension – The Diplomat); also covers India’s denial, citing heavy rains as the real cause (Unprecedented Floods Fuel Bangladesh-India Tension – The Diplomat).

  6. S&P Global (IHS Markit), “Controversial Tipaimukh Dam Strains India-Bangladesh Relations” – notes the Tipaimukh Dam plan was criticized for its environmental impact on Bangladesh’s Sylhet region (Controversial Tipaimukh Hydroelectric Dam Strains India-Bangladesh Relations) and that India downplayed fears of reduced flow as “empty slogans” (Controversial Tipaimukh Hydroelectric Dam Strains India-Bangladesh Relations).

  7. icddr,b Climate Change Impacts, “Salinity in drinking water” – explains that India’s Farakka Barrage (operational 1975) caused a “significant reduced flow in Bangladesh during dry seasons and further propagation of saline water inland,” permanently changing the region’s soil and water regime (Salinity in drinking water - Climate Change Impacts on Health and Population in Bangladesh).

  8. Dhaka Tribune, “Bangladesh protests killing of a national by Indian BSF” – reports an official protest in Oct 2024, where Bangladesh noted that despite India’s promises to bring border killings to zero, BSF shootings continue (Bangladesh protests killing of a national by Indian BSF). It cites 31 Bangladeshis killed by BSF in 2023 and over 560 killed from 2009–2022 (Bangladesh protests killing of a national by Indian BSF).

  9. The Diplomat, “After a Teenage Girl Is Killed on the Border, a War of Narratives Emerges” – provides context on BSF border killings, with human rights data: 31 killed in 2023, and over 1,200 Bangladeshis killed between 2000–2020 according to Odhikar (After a Teenage Girl Is Killed on the Bangladesh-India Border, a War of Narratives Emerges – The Diplomat) (After a Teenage Girl Is Killed on the Bangladesh-India Border, a War of Narratives Emerges – The Diplomat). Illustrates how such incidents fuel anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh.

  10. Wikipedia, “Teesta Water Dispute” – outlines the history: an 1983 interim sharing (Bangladesh 36%, India 39%) never cemented, a 2011 draft treaty stalled by West Bengal’s objections (Teesta Water Dispute - Wikipedia), and how water shortages in Bangladesh’s Teesta basin cost ~1.5 million tons of rice annually (Teesta Water Dispute - Wikipedia). Also notes the new interim government under Yunus in 2024 made Teesta talks a priority (Teesta Water Dispute - Wikipedia).

  11. The Financial Express (BD), “Ganges treaty: What happens after 2026?” – discusses concerns as the 1996 Ganges Treaty expires in 2026: Bangladesh often did not receive promised flows in past dry seasons (Ganges treaty: What happens after 2026? | The Financial Express) and calls for an updated agreement to ensure its fair share amid upstream withdrawals and climate variability (Ganges treaty: What happens after 2026? | The Financial Express) (Ganges treaty: What happens after 2026? | The Financial Express).

  12. The Daily Star (BD), “Dhaka, Delhi eye shared prosperity” – reminds that Bangladesh and India share 54 rivers, but only the Ganges has a water-sharing treaty, underscoring the breadth of water issues still unresolved (Unprecedented Floods Fuel Bangladesh-India Tension – The Diplomat) (Dhaka, Delhi eye shared prosperity - The Daily Star).

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